Time-based history: perspectives on documenting performance by Wakefield, Nik
REVIEW ESSAY 
 Performance Matters 1.1-2 (2015): 167-179 • Time-Based History 167 
Time-Based History:  
Perspectives on Documenting Performance 
 
Nik Wakefield 
 
In this review of literature on performance documentation, I aim to highlight strengths and 
weaknesses of existing scholarship in order to suggest ways in which the field might develop. 
Although I will be most forthright about my own stakes in this development at the conclusion of 
this review, I should say that my perspective is oriented toward the fields of performance 
philosophy and practice as research, while also invested in fashioning a temporal aesthetics, or 
what I call the time-specificity of performance. This text is positioned a step before a more 
fulsome elaboration of time-specificity but nevertheless addresses the need for such a concept 
through its very process of selection. For example, the kinds of literature to be found here are 
mostly all located after performance. Few take account of the production of documents before 
and during performance, such as the scores that are a part of much contemporary dance practice 
or the elements of performance that are being taken up by many in the field of poetic practice. 
Part of what time-specificity acknowledges is the multiple temporalities of performance: the 
before, during, and after, and how they persist through time. 
 
This review begins with the notion of ephemerality as ontological disappearance, as posited by 
Peggy Phelan. I also take up the wide array of responses to Phelan from performance theory and 
practice, while also adding in some perspectives from art history and criticism, philosophy, and 
political theory. Some of these writings were published before Unmarked: The Politics of Performance 
(1993) but were not included in that study nor taken up as responses to it. Central concepts that 
I will explore in what follows are, of course, documentation and performance, but also 
disappearance, presence, archive, archaeology, memory, becoming, form, and, finally, vital 
materialism and time-specificity.  
 
Why is a review of this literature important? Because an understanding of practical and 
theoretical approaches to documenting performance has implications for the historiography and 
institutionalization of theatre, drama, and performance. More importantly, a sense of clarity on 
the two dominant practices of our field, performing and writing, is necessary in order to 
maintain the confidence to sustain such practices. Exploring the relation between writing and 
performance might bond artistic and academic communities through evaluation and 
demystification. I write and perform to find out what you will perform and write back to me. 
Between us is the affirmation of difference, the emergence of value translated not as tolerance or 
agreement, but rather as heterogeneity. This is perhaps what makes a review important, as it is 
itself a document of multiple performances: performances of thought, critical thinking, and 
writing that sustain the continuity of multiplicity in a diverse field. 
 
Disappearing Presence Performing Live 
 
The questions surrounding the documentation of performance have generated a vast amount of 
discourse. Photography and writing are often the primary mediums academics use to access                                        
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performance outside their own spatiotemporal location. Discourses about performance and 
documentation often lean into philosophical territory as researchers find themselves needing to 
clarify what it is exactly that is being documented and the relationships performance has to 
photography and writing.  
 
In the field of performance studies Phelan’s 1993 book Unmarked has shaped much of the debate 
about how performance is documented and what it is. She writes that performance “becomes 
itself through disappearance” (Phelan 1993, 146). It is an axiom of Phelan’s theory of 
ephemerality that what once was now is lost. She posits that the critic’s work has the potential to 
erase the performance. That any complete documentation of performance itself is impossible is 
stated precisely in order to stake an ideological position regarding performance’s radical stance 
against commodification. Phelan’s is an ontological argument in the face of the archive, gallery, 
and museum as structures of capital. It defines performance as something that cannot be sold 
because it is gone before it is over. Although Phelan’s point about disappearance has come to 
dominate appraisals of her subtle and nuanced work, she goes on to make important points 
about how different kinds of writing can retain the ephemerality of performance.  
 
In direct opposition to Phelan’s privileging of disappearance is Philip Auslander’s 1999 book 
Liveness: Performance in a Mediatized Culture. He takes issue with any notion of directness in the 
experience of performance before it is written about. His argument is that the same 
mediatization that for Phelan erases performance is already functioning as an inherent aspect of 
experience. Performance is already mediatized, so documenting it cannot be said to alter it.  
 
Advancing this argument in a 2006 article titled “The Performativity of Performance 
Documentation,” Auslander defends the role of documentation as a formative part of rather 
than secondary practice to performance. He states that documentation can be the end goal of 
performance, referencing Kathy O’Dell who had previously argued that “performance is the 
virtual equivalent of its documentation,” a reciprocal approach that perhaps deviates from 
Auslander’s overall argument of an aesthetic of mediatization (O’Dell 1997, 3). Auslander goes 
further, suggesting that some performances are even staged in ways that configure 
documentation as more important than the audience. Unconvinced by an intersubjective 
definition of performance as an act between performer and audience, Auslander posits that if 
performance were really about this relationship then documentation would not omit the 
audience, as it does in most cases (Auslander 2006, 7).  
 
Amelia Jones has written extensively on the issue of presence and its role in both performance 
and documentation. Like Auslander, Jones seeks to problematize the notion of an original and 
pure performance. In a 1997 article, “’Presence’ in Absentia: Experiencing Performance as 
Documentation,” she defends the position of only being able to view performance as 
documentation because the differences “are largely logistical rather than ethical or hermeneutic” 
(Jones 1997, 11). For Jones, whether one attends to performance or documentation makes little 
if any difference because” neither has a privileged relationship to the historical ‘truth’ of the 
performance” (Jones 1997, 11).  
 
In her extensive article on Marina Abramović’s “The Artist is Present,” published in 2011, Jones 
expands on her earlier work, arguing that the artist is not actually present if we accept that 
presence is something that cannot be documented or commodified. For Jones, an art historian, 
performance must be able to be preserved. Sympathetic to Jones, and yet still prioritizing the 
phenomena of experience, is Simon Bayly, who in his 2011 book Pathognomy of Performance reveals 
the complexity of the issue, writing that while “‘presence’ is never coexistent with its experience . 
. . the ‘liveness’ of human (co-)presence is still something profoundly and doggedly meaningful” 
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(2011, 57). Bayly admits that the relation between performance and presence is not simple. 
Perhaps this is its very importance. His perspective is persuasive unless one advocates an 
evolution in which performance becomes a subgenre of photography or film more easily 
reproduced mechanically for widespread dissemination. Jones and Auslander rightly reveal the 
non-original and already mediated operations of performance. While their points are surely not 
calling for an end to performance, they do run the risk of problematizing liveness to the point of 
it losing value. In contrast, Bayly admits that presence is not secured by performance without 
severing the tie to living experience.  
 
In 2012 Amelia Jones and Adrian Heathfield published their edited tome Perform Repeat Record: 
Live Art in History, in which commentators grapple with how to historicize performance, with 
documentation and disappearance emerging as central themes. The first section of the book, 
entitled “Theories,” contains numerous essays, most of which, like Auslander’s “The 
Performativity of Performance Documentation,” specifically respond to Phelan’s notion of 
disappearance. For example, Sven Lütticken argues against the notion of disappearance by 
referencing the dematerialization at the heart of contemporary art practices such as that of Tino 
Seghal. The fact that no material or documentation may be produced or disseminated about 
Seghal’s work is the exact reason his practice becomes so highly valued and commodified in a 
culture based on performing for capital. Christopher Bedford’s response to Phelan is also 
convincing; he argues for an ontology of performance that acknowledges the way it continues 
into the future and multiplies historically, stating that “performance is a myth-making medium 
and as such essentially viral in nature” (Bedford, in Jones and Heathfield 2012, 86). 
  
Reenacting Remains 
 
One provocative response to Phelan’s framework is Rebecca Schneider’s 2011 book Performing 
Remains: Art and War in Times of Theatrical Reenactment, which expands on theories advanced in an 
earlier article titled “Performance Remains” (2001). Schneider critiques Phelan’s logic, making 
use of the process of reenactment and Jacques Derrida’s 1998 book Archive Fever. She argues that 
Phelan’s privileging of an ontology of performance as disappearance ends up reinforcing the 
“logic of the archive” (Schneider 2011, 98).  
 
Rather than ontology, Schneider applies a theory of reenactment in order to arrive at a version of 
performance that does not disappear. Her title thus has two meanings: realizing that reenactors 
perform remains signals that performance remains. Reenactment, Schneider suggests, shows that 
performance reappears. Following this logic, “when we approach performance . . . as . . . 
remaining we are almost immediately forced to admit that remains do not have to be isolated in 
the document” (Schneider 2011, 101). If Phelan’s argument was to encourage modes of writing 
able to capture the ephemeral ontology of performance, Schneider’s point is to take care with 
how the remains of performance are returned to. As useful and convincing as both these 
approaches are, they also are positioned after the performance. It will be useful also to have 
theoretical frameworks that take account of performance before and during its becoming, a 
point to which I will return. 
 
In his 2007 book Documentation, Disappearance and the Representation of Live Performance, Matthew 
Reason finds that disappearance is a contradiction, because “some continued existence and 
retention within memory is always at least implied” (Reason 2007, 26). He also examines the 
tensions between mechanical and live reproduction—in the case of big-budget musicals, for 
example—and notes that even in this situation a “transience” exists in the link between the live 
body and the represented character (Reason 2007, 18 and 20). But here Reason makes the 
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assumption that the live body can lay claim to authenticity, which Auslander and Jones would 
take issue with.  
 
In her article on Marina Abramović, Jones points to an implication of reenactments in the same 
way Schneider points to the hidden function of the archive. Each makes knowledge available for 
future “repetition” (Schneider 2011, 108). Jones writes: “While often posed as confirming the 
truth of the past, paradoxically re-enactments activate the now as always already over, the present 
always already turning into the future—and both continually escaping human knowledge” (Jones 
2011, 43). Jones shows that tensions between past and present are inherent in both 
documentation and reenactment, as neither of these phenomena would be complete without a 
double and more. Further complicating Jones’ conception of the impossibility of an original 
moment, Adrian Heathfield and Andrew Quick, in their introduction to “On Memory,” a special 
issue of the journal Performance Research in 2000, indicate the similarities between memory and 
reenactment, explaining that the work of reenacting performance is analogous to an act of 
memory, in that the “lost originary moment is (partially) retrieved and reconstituted” (Heathfield 
and Quick 2000, 1).  
 
Reenactment brings with it the same paradox that is found in photography, according to Susan 
Sontag in her 1973 monograph On Photography. She explains that photographs have a “pseudo-
presence” because the image is a material artifact existing now; but the photograph is also “a 
token of absence” because it is contingent on a past event that was photographed (Sontag 1973, 
16). In 1989, Henry M. Sayre made a similar comment in The Object of Performance: The American 
Avant-Garde Since 1970. His dialectic of presence and absence is construed as “ritual” and 
“narrative” (Sayre 1989, 17). The former does while the latter tells.  
 
The phenomenon of reenactment problematizes performance as ever able to be original because 
it returns something that may have otherwise been considered lost. Reenactment reveals that 
performance is rarely, if ever, singular. It functions with memory and enforces a nature of 
multiplicity concerning its origin. Abramović herself prescribes a method of reenactment that by 
its lack of specificity reveals this difficult issue, saying that “any re-enactment should address the 
big issues that the original piece was about at the time” (Abramović, in Jones and Heathfield 
2012, 554). Which issues are big is a question that I will return to at greater length below. 
 
Jan Verwoert’s 2010 book Tell Me What You Want, What You Really, Really Want looks at how 
community is made through art and philosophy. Echoing Auslander, Verwoert’s comment on 
visual art could just as well describe the contradiction hidden in documents as in reenactments: 
“These paintings are not a live performance. But they perform live” (Verwoert 2010, 151). What 
they perform live and the implications arising from this are more problematic. Focusing on how 
artists appropriate history, Verwoert tellingly questions a central caveat of appropriation, which 
may also be an aspect of reenactments: “The only thing we should maybe be less optimistic about 
is the possibility of thinking of the object of appropriation and the knowledge it generates in 
terms of property” (Verwoert 2010, 134). The notion of property brings with it the notion of 
possession, and thus the economic implications of reenactments mirror the issues of authenticity 
that Jones questions in Abramović’s redo’s of other artists’ performances. 
 
Historical repetition brings up the fundamental question at the heart of Jones and Heathfield’s 
Perform Repeat Record: how to do performance art history. Perhaps live art should be studied like 
painting, in which students copy masterpieces in order to develop personal technique; or as 
drama, in which seminal performances become reenactable scores no different from Hamlet, with 
a credited author and a copyrighted form. In both cases, understanding the nature of memory is 
helpful. As Jan Verwoert explains, 
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As you write or paint, words you have read or images you have seen elsewhere 
(including those which you have forgotten) are present in your work as latent 
memories. The same latencies are in play in the moment of reading or looking at 
a painting as when the words of the pages you have read before reverberate in 
the words you presently read, or the images you have been exposed to resonate 
with what you see when you look at what you presently face. (Verwoert 2010, 
30–31) 
 
The long quote is important because it demonstrates the creativity of memory in both the artist 
and the beholder. Memory is the vehicle through which the past interpenetrates with the present. 
In the work of the artist and the critic the past is retained, in ways that are sometimes conscious 
and sometimes not, through the differentiations that new work manifests. 
  
Archaeology 
 
In the discussion of her place in reenacting other artists’ performances, Marina Abramović casts 
herself in a surprising role, saying “I was feeling like an archaeologist really” (Abramović, in Jones 
and Heathfield 2012, 549). Mike Pearson and Michael Shanks use the same language in 
Theatre/Archaeology from 2001:  
 
It may ultimately be more appropriate to discuss performance (particularly 
devised performance) through archaeological rather than literary means, with 
performance as a kind of prehistory of scripted drama, and to imagine the 
retrieval and recontextualisation of performance as constituting a theatre 
archaeology. (Pearson and Shanks 2001, 13) 
 
In this seemingly simple theoretical move, they thus privilege the experience of performance over 
its material through a focus on the deeper time of, surprisingly, material and the more enmeshed 
conception of performance in context. What follows in their book is a convincing argument for 
an interdisciplinary theory through the delineation of practical approaches.  
 
Pearson writes from the perspective of a performance maker/theorist and Shanks as 
archaeologist, though as the book proceeds the lines are crossed, blurred, and erased. They work 
first to show how archaeology, like performance, is a creative act of “cultural production” 
(Pearson and Shanks 2001, 11). The opportunity archaeology presents to performance 
documentation is that it aims at “making a past work a present presence” through objects and 
sites in which embodiment is long gone (ibid.). Performance reveals to archaeology concrete 
manifestations of the relationships between the live and the material.  
 
The work of theatre/archaeology starts with the present. It inventories only as a way to begin. It 
travels into history, acknowledging that the past is virtual. The present is the site of the critical 
acts of theatre/archaeology, Pearson and Shanks argue, in that “we should retain the ambiguity 
and tension which is actuality; actuality is the primacy, but not superiority, of the present over the 
past” (Pearson and Shanks 2001, 42, emphasis in original). The relationship between past and 
present is ambivalent and unpredictable. Various sites of archaeology and different forms of 
documentation require specific iterations and explications of a past moment’s ties to now. The 
writers even go as far as to suggest that the “temporality of performance and the archaeological 
project is neither linear nor a slice through time; it is convoluted. Memories, pasts, continuities, 
present aspirations and designs are assembled in the work that is performance and archaeology” 
(Pearson and Shanks 2001, 55). Theatre/archaeology commits to a heterogeneous temporality of 
performance. Its temporal perspective is mobile as if moving around the time of the work rather 
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than always coming after it. Which implies, then, that when it returns, the performance will have 
changed. Repetition through time is not of the event, but of something else altogether as 
“nothing ever happens twice, because it has already happened before” (Pearson and Shanks 2001, 
55). 
 
What is repeated is not ontologically destabilized because it has been or will be repeated, but 
instead because what is being repeated was never static in the first place. Experiences are not 
objects. For Pearson and Shanks, both the performance and the document are simulacra 
(Pearson and Shanks 2001, 92). Originality, on the other hand, presumes stability, and 
theatre/archaeology comes close to wholly rejecting it: “To think authenticity as essential and 
intrinsic obscures the relationship of exchange which exists between past and present” (Pearson 
and Shanks 2001, 114). It is not only the past that has an effect on the present. The novelty of the 
present occasions reinterpretations of the past which can be powerful enough to appear to 
change the past itself, whether or not they actually do. Rather than dwell on the complexity of 
that issue, the authors commit to a practice outside the trappings of fixity. Instead, they advocate 
an aesthetic of the “unauthentic” which proposes to bring the practitioner and attendee into a 
creative relation (Pearson and Shanks 2001, 119). Inauthentic performance might make a claim to 
originality or truth whereas the unauthentic transparently reveals its sources. Pearson and Shanks’ 
suggestion here retains a complex sense of time as multiple because it reveals an interpenetration 
between the past and the present. 
 
Theatre/archaeology reveals a different kind of relationship between the formative documents 
of performance and their manifestation. When performance is rendered unauthentic, its sources 
are transparently separate. The moment of embodiment brings with it a “haunting past” that it 
never attempts to conceal, possess, or contain (Pearson and Shanks 2001, 126). Advocating a 
transparent relationship between aims and outcomes, “the work [of theatre/archaeology, which 
might be a performance and might be writing about performance] is a reading ‘onto’ and ‘into’ 
rather than a reading ‘from’” (Pearson and Shanks 2001, 146). The benefits of credited 
appropriation resurface, referring to Verwoert’s caveat, as practices outside of economic and 
ontological operations. In this case “performance occasions reinterpretation,” enacting a mode 
of documenting performance that is as critical as it is creative (Pearson and Shanks 2001, 59).  
 
Pearson and Shanks advise thinking forensically about what kinds of performance documents 
can be used to discover and preserve different aspects of performance (Pearson and Shanks 
2001, 59–61). Theatre/archaeology, then, is a way through the problematic practices of 
reenactment, performance, and documentation. It enables thinking qualitatively through these 
issues, which allows for the constant invention and reinvention of forms, lives, and objects to be 
at the heart of the historical evolution of performance. It also implies that historiography might 
want to reflect this process. Performances and documents erupt of the present, not without a 
diverse swathe of accomplices. They are continually doing so. 
 
Appearance, Form, Becoming, Transformation 
 
In a chapter in the 2006 collection A Performance Cosmology, edited by Judie Christie, Richard 
Gough, and Peter Watt, David Williams indicates that Phelan’s ephemeral ontology is founded 
on a paradox, noting that “disappearance is the function of appearance” (Williams, in Christie, 
Gough, and Watt 2006, 105). Remaining and reenactment, too, can only be functions of 
appearance. To take this point further, I suggest that whether a performance disappears or 
remains after it ends is impossible to determine. Before getting to any prediction of what may 
happen in the future, performance must first do something other than disappear or remain.  
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Performance appears. This is necessary in order for it to disappear or remain. But appearances 
must be unlocked from primarily visual and representational modes. For Bayly “there is a void at 
the heart of appearing,” but perhaps the void is only that which is past or future (Bayly 2011, 58). 
I am advocating an appearance defined in terms of becoming as a result of transformation. This 
is the processual nature of performance through its various iterative appearances: plans, scores, 
experiences, documents, and memories. Each becoming is a transitional process. Such an 
approach rejects the fixity implied in the word being. Becoming opens processes to the past and 
the future, as Elizabeth Grosz explains in the introduction to her edited book Becomings (Grosz 
1999, 15–28). Appearance as becoming can offer an ontology of performance rooted in 
performance itself. 
 
The way performance becomes and appears is not only visual. It is multisensory, cognitive, 
affective, spiritual, and charged with memory. These kinds of becomings and appearances have 
been called “forms” in art history. In the mode of appearance as becoming, form is not only a 
result of creative forces but also a part of those forces. In this perspective, form aligns itself to a 
particular manifestation of an artwork and virtual counterparts. Form is therefore multiple as it is 
located in the present of the artwork but not separated from the past through memory and the 
future through desire. This multiplicity is the immanent temporality of form including present, 
past, and future. The present form is continuous with past and future forms. 
 
Form is in and of the document and the performance. In The Life of Forms in Art, the French art 
historian Henri Focillon argues for a reconceiving of art history that identifies form as living 
(Focillon 1948, 33). Because Focillon theorizes a vitalism at the core of art history, which 
responds to Platonic antitheatricality by taking appearances seriously, his framework is useful for 
live art historiography. Following Balzac, Focillon writes that “Life is form, and form is the 
modality of life” (Focillon 1948, 33). The book never pins down a singular definition of form. 
Form translates into a plethora of scenes, and like theatre/archaeology what this nebulousness 
makes possible is an approach to art history that takes change to be fundamental: “Art begins 
with transmutation and continues with metamorphosis” (Focillon 1948, 169). Form is what goes 
on living, is what remains, because it continues to change. In Focillon’s view, form is prehistory 
and it is inescapable. But this is not deterministic, because form is life, so it moves, changes, and 
even acts: “Man works on himself. But he does not, it is true, rid himself of the age-old deposits 
laid down by time, and they are something that must be accounted for. What they constitute is a 
tonality, rather than an armature or a foundation” (Focillon 1948, 142). Focillon accounts for the 
interpenetration of the past and the present, specifically as the past creating the conditions for 
the present as opposed to determining it through causality. The agency of the artist remains 
intact, empowered by history. 
 
With the artist’s work, the life of forms breathes through each painting, performance, and 
document. As Focillon notes, “A score of experiments, be they recent or forthcoming, are 
invariably interwoven behind the well-defined evidence of the image” (Focillon 1948, 41). Here 
form is in the realm of the barely visible. It is not only already there but also waiting to happen. 
Form is the document of the performance that has yet to be imagined, but form is also in the 
tendencies that will lead to performance. Form is what allows the painting to create space 
(Focillon 1948, 65). In live art, form is what allows performance to create time. Focillon indicates 
that seeing art in this way cancels any sense of static images: “Form is always, not the desire for 
action, but action itself” (Focillon 1948, 119). Art as action accounts for its creative relations 
with time and space. Art in this way is not about allowing agency, but perhaps becomes agency 
itself. Performance makes time; this is one manifestation of its temporal specificity. Becomings 
of form are temporal creations. 
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Form may manifest as action in performance documents as well. Imagine you tell a story about 
your childhood, holding the actual object the story involves, showing the scar left by the 
moment. The life of forms for this performance suggests several sets of documents. One set 
might transcribe the spoken words of the story while another set gives a prompt to tell a story 
about your childhood in which you show an object that gave you a scar and then you show the 
scar. There are many other ways such a performance could be documented, and any will in some 
way provide access to the past through memory. 
 
Those different kinds of documents lead to new interpretations that would each preserve 
different aspects of the original performance. Each one would also substitute something entirely 
new, as the framework of Joseph Roach’s surrogates expresses. What documentation of 
performance proves here is less that performance is not authentic and more that it works 
through alteration. As Heathfield explains, “the multiple lives of performance, dissected, 
represented, re-performed [suggest] that one of performance’s most consistent and recurring 
conditions is transformation” (Heathfield, in Jones and Heathfield 2012, 32). The disappearance of 
the live through writing indicates the creation of a new appearance in writing. The reenactment 
substitutes locational context but creates a congruent dramaturgical form. Each one maintains 
the life of forms, and each one is an appearance that becomes. Even disappearance is a kind of 
becoming. 
 
David Williams writes that “appearances, like love, can be transformative becomings” (Williams, 
in Christie, Gough, and Watt 2006, 105). Williams here is working through Phelan’s logic of love 
to carve out, through writing, a space of appearance for performance. The immediacy of these 
becomings substantiates their reality and at the same time reduces them to a factor of the 
ongoing processes of transformation. They are neither eternal nor ephemeral because of 
memory. Each becoming brings about and is brought about by movement.  
 
In the 2007 book Theatres of Thought: Theatre, Performance and Philosophy, edited by Daniel Watt and 
Daniel Meyer-Dinkgrafe, Laura Cull and Matthew Goulish compose a performed document 
called “A Dialogue on Becoming.” Beginning with a particular anecdote about how identity is a 
part of theatre company Goat Island’s working process, they arrive at a central idea, that “[a] 
performer is becoming” (Cull and Goulish, in Watt and Mayer-Dinkgrafe 2007, 56). Identity is 
not fixed. It is constantly being made. It requires continuous analysis because it is always 
becoming. For Cull and Goulish, the work of Goat Island resists ontological, archival, 
mediatized-based and reenactment-based thinking about what performance is and does: “All the 
different beings, identities and entities we conceive in conscious experience are but the effects of 
a primary, universal becoming” (56). Manifestations are the particulars and specifics that will 
again be renewed. 
 
For Cull and Goulish, becoming is based on a process inseparable from two phenomena: 
moment and movement (61). The immediacy of performance is contestable but irreducible. It 
does happen in time and of duration, but time here is something mobile. Becoming depends on 
these processes, and these processes depend on becoming. While these ideas developed out of 
their working processes, notably their practice of creative response, Cull and Goulish admit that 
finding the temporal philosophy of Henri Bergson gave them a framework within which to 
reference their intuitions. Specifically referring to Bergson’s Matter and Memory (1912), Goulish 
writes, “the notion of identity as becoming, it seems to me now, comes to us via this 
understanding of perception and memory” (Cull and Goulish, in Watt and Meyer-Dinkgrafe 
2007, 61). As will be shown toward the end of this text, Bergson’s writing on memory opens up 
a productive relationship between the past and the present through matter and memory. 
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The Double Archive: Experiences and Memories 
 
Published between and to a certain extent bridging the central ideas of Phelan’s Unmarked and 
Schneider’s Performing Remains is Diana Taylor’s 2003 book The Archive and the Repertoire: Cultural 
Memory and Performance in the Americas. Like Schneider, Taylor finds that performance is repeated 
continually as an operation inherent within culture: “The repertoire . . . enacts embodied 
memory . . . all those acts usually thought of as ephemeral, nonreproducible knowledge” (Taylor 
2003, 20). She suggests the repertoire has a relationship to the archive that is symbiotic. Taylor 
maintains that writing and performance are not “binaries” or “sequential,” in which one process 
causes another (Taylor 2003, 22). She insists that what is performed from the archive and how its 
contents are valued are different throughout time, reinforcing the belief in the archive’s stability 
but introducing change to its reception, an idea both Jones and Schneider will return to. Whether 
one believes the archive or the repertoire to be more significant, Taylor asserts that it has always 
been the case that “writing was far more dependent on embodied culture for transmission than 
the other way around” (Taylor 2003, 17). 
 
Attending to the relation of performance and archives is Gunhild Borggreen and Rune Gade’s 
2013 collection Performing Archives/Archives of Performance. This nearly five hundred-page collection 
of essays again takes up the notion of ontological disappearance via Phelan, but with a different 
approach to that taken by Perform Repeat Record. Where Jones and Heathfield’s book addressed 
historiography, Borggreen and Gade’s collection “proposes a twofold movement of ongoing and 
mutual interaction” between performance and archives (Borggreen and Gade 2013, 10). The 
book is notable for its diversity of theoretical approaches, such as Heike Roms’ astute essay 
“Archiving Legacies: Who Cares for Performance Remains?” In this essay Roms thinks through 
the archive for its practices of caring for long durations, as “one documents a piece of work, but 
one archives a body of work” (Roms, in Borggreen and Gade 2013, 36). The book as a whole is 
also significant for its delicate treatment of how a kind of archival turn may currently be taking 
place in practices from performance to visual art and curation.  
 
Using the terms of performance in a manner like the selection of volumes from an archive, 
Joseph Roach provides yet another analysis of performance as it presents itself to the future in 
his 1996 book Cities of the Dead: Circum-Atlantic Performance:  
 
The process of trying out various candidates in different situations—the doomed 
search for originals by continuously auditioning stand-ins—is the most important 
of the many meanings users intend when they use the word performance. . . . 
Performance, in other words, stands in for an elusive entity that it is not but that 
it must vainly aspire both to embody and to replace. (Roach 1996, 3–4) 
 
Roach prosaically explains here that there is always a doubleness, at least, to the operations of 
performance. This definition offers a framework for a longer life of performance beyond the 
present. Roach shows how memory is not inert in the action of performance. As Jean 
Baudrillard writes in his 1981 book Simulacra and Simulation, memories of performance, as 
reenactments and as documents, are copies of a copy, simulacra, because there is no original.  
 
It may be that Baudrillard’s theory of simulacra finds an excellent example in the conception 
that documentation and reenactment are not less truthful than performance because the 
experience itself is not without its own set of precursors. As Schneider puts it, “in performance 
as memory, the pristine self-sameness of an ’original,’ an artifact so valued by the archive, is 
rendered impossible—or, if you will, mythic” (Schneider 2011, 100). Phelan too does not 
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proceed without admitting the link, explaining that the “document of a performance then is 
only a spur to memory, an encouragement of memory to become present” (Phelan 1993, 146).  
 
Returning to Heathfield and Quick’s introduction to their edition of Performance Research, “On 
Memory,” they note there that: “Just as performance is a vital component in the operation of 
memory, remembering and forgetting are crucial dynamics in the make-up of performance” 
(Heathfield and Quick 2000, 1). Memory is a crucial part of the reality of performance beyond its 
representational aspects because it aims attention toward specific becomings and forgets others. 
Likewise, as necessary as memory is for making the performance it is also a part of observing it: 
“Performance, like the traumatic event, can exceed its spectator’s understanding and 
consequently set in play the need for its repetition through memory, language and 
representation” (Heathfield and Quick 2000, 3). Trauma is substantiated over a longer duration 
than experience itself. The continuity of these kinds of memory creates an excess of affect. 
Through this continuity countless repetitions are possible. There is a multiplicity to memory. It 
performs a past in the present. This multiplicity gives way to another, the double of memory 
shaping performance from behind and repeating it forward.  
 
This points to a pivotal question at the heart of how to document performance: the question of 
scope. For example, is a performance enacting or reenacting an artist’s intention, visual shape, or 
narrative content? What kinds of documents would leave traces of each? Surely documents of 
performance need be as multiple as performance itself in which different perspectives accumulate 
toward its wholeness. Another question of scale, as it refers to the position from which the work 
is viewed, is what role do documents cast the viewer into: audience or artist? How the document 
configures remembrance of performance is essential for a comprehensive history of performance. 
That experience and memory are multiplicities leads to the position that documentation also 
should manifest as a multiplicity. It will offer the fullest memory of performance if it channels 
several, sometimes contradictory, scales of experiencing performance.  
 
Document Memory and Vital Materialism 
 
Claims of a binary existing between writing and performance collapse under not only the weight 
of memory but also of time. Stuart Brisley corrects any misconceptions about performance 
documents lasting forever: “The issue is not one of the ephemeral versus the permanent. 
Nothing is forever. It is the question of the relative durations of the impermanent” (Brisley, in 
Jones and Heathfield 2012, 30). Taking account of other durations beyond human scales makes 
the fragility, or temporariness, of appearances visible. For example, it is only from an 
anthropocentric perspective that photographs do not visibly decay. Temporality reveals that both 
performance and documentation are temporary. The repertoire may continue long after the walls 
of the archive have been reduced to dust. Memory allows access to the past. Performance is 
unimaginable without some memory. Memory’s various repetitions through different moments 
and media are constitutive of the transformational process of appearances constantly becoming. 
Specific manifestations will, as in Roach’s definition of performance, substitute various stand-ins 
for the role, but later memory might forgo the role and perform the stand-in. The purposefully 
unauthentic aesthetic of theatre/archaeology seems to paradoxically return reliability to 
performance. The memory persists because it appears, disappears, remains, is reenacted, 
archived, and performed. Memory, like performance, appears.  
 
As Matthew Reason suggests, “ideas of time are central within discourses of documentation,” 
because performance only disappears if time is represented as a spatial line, a discrete succession 
of moments (Reason 2006, 210). When the past and present are constantly interpenetrating, 
through memory, it is very difficult to remain confident that disappearance will not soon give 
Nik Wakefield 
Performance Matters 1.1-2 (2015): 167-179 • Time-Based History 177 
way to another different appearance. Of course, it is possible to imagine any number of 
performances that may have completely disappeared if the people who once remembered them 
have now forgotten or are dead. It is also likely that some effect of this hypothetical performance 
memory would influence future action unconsciously through habit. 
 
For philosopher Henri Bergson there is recollection and habit memory, and for him memory 
appears when the action in the present necessitates knowledge of the past. The appearance in the 
document itself has temporal orders and its own duration. It has a duration of apprehension that 
depends on use and obsolescence. When the document begins to fade, it is disappearing. When 
the document suddenly is used for reenactment, as Auslander suggests, the resulting 
performance might have more integrity to the documentation than the previously documented 
performance (Auslander 2006, 2). The document does have its own power over the living 
memory of performance. Performance documents have a spirit, if for no other reason than they 
can never be complete.  
 
The vitality of documents might be theorized through the work of Jane Bennett. In her 2010 
book Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things, Bennett identifies the way non-human entities 
act in political events. In a move that mirrors the trends of posthumanism by brilliant thinkers 
such as Rosi Braidotti, Bennett offers a materialism with vitality, by which she means “the 
capacity of things . . . to act . . . as forces with trajectories, propensities, or tendencies of their 
own” (Bennett 2010, viii). Bennett’s work is especially significant because it allows performance 
studies to take account of the vitality of objects of performance documentation in a shift that 
might do away with stultifying binaries. Bennett’s work also speaks to how performing and 
writing might take place. Is not her question “how to describe without thereby erasing the 
independence of things?” after all a parallel interrogation of the potential power of visibility 
through writing that Phelan was concerned with in Unmarked (Bennett 2010, xiii)? If Phelan was 
questioning whether certain kinds of writing might betray performance, Bennett’s framework 
offers a way to see “events as encounters between ontologically diverse actants, some human, 
some not, though all thoroughly material” (Bennett 2010, xiv). In the vital materialist mode both 
performance and documentation are intertwined in a greater ecology of transformation. 
 
Time-Specificity 
 
Transformation is driven by the constant becoming of difference that is at the core of duration. 
Time-specificity of performance defines temporality as duration and develops concepts of lived 
experience from this perspective. It arises therefore out of the philosophy of Bergson and artists 
such as Tehching Hsieh, Janez Janša, Janez Janša, Janez Janša, and Every House Has a Door. 
While Bergson in Matter and Memory seeks to overcome the metaphysical problems of dualism by 
determining the connection between l’esprit (mind) and corps (body) as not a question of where 
but when, a when that is memory, each of the three groups of artists develop modes of 
documentation as a generative constraint. The same qualities of attention given to composition 
of performance are devoted toward documents. Tehching Hsieh and Adrian Heathfield’s 2009 
book Out of Now: The Lifeworks of Tehching Hsieh, for example, shows every still image from the 
strip of film Hsieh used to photograph himself, one frame at a time, every hour of a year from 
1980–1981. The performance produced this document, which can be displayed as a sequence of 
still images or as a six-minute film. 
 
In my own practice as research that has developed as a critical and creative response to Bergson 
and these artists (see Wakefield 2014), I have explored how each act of artistic creation might be 
continuous with the same tendencies that drive evolution, or what Bergson calls élan vital (vital 
impetus). In Three, the last in a trilogy of works responding to Hsieh, Janša, Janša, Janša, and 
Nik Wakefield 
Performance Matters 1.1-2 (2015): 167-179 • Time-Based History 178 
Every House Has a Door, I attempted to adapt to the conditions of the theatre as if it were an 
environment. An ongoing illness impaired the physical abilities that I had made use of for the 
previous works. The solution I relied on was to fold memories from my personal life into the 
composition of the performance in the same way I had previously done with certain demanding 
physical techniques such as slow-motion movement or tennis choreography, the intention being 
to make visible the past that was being made present. However, the personal memories were 
displaced, not explained or given context. For example, I performed a very simple magic trick 
that friends of mine have seen countless times. In Three the trick became a part of a moment 
exploring the concept of a “pre-performance,” or a work that is being gestured toward in a 
present but cannot be performed presently. The pre-performance would be magical, dangerous 
(wielding a sharp knife), and composed (holding a piece of paper containing the score of the 
performance). Thus the third performance maintained the sense from the previous works that a 
regular and processual practice had gone into the making of the work. An evolution had taken 
place that allowed me to perform that day, but the adaptations included not only deliberate 
practice of a certain kind of moving but also conceptual organization. I could not have avoided 
adapting to the environment of the theatre because the time of the performance was continuous 
with the time of my body, its illness, and therefore the very materials of evolution. Now that I 
have reached a stage of remission with this illness, future iterations of Three would need to be 
altered. 
 
The implication of this continuity is that thinking theory and doing practice, performance and 
documentation, caring for the archive, and any act of memory are all becomings of a 
heterogeneous assemblage of forces. If I attempt to in any way advance an argument with this 
text, it would be that taking account of temporality as a force prompts the creation of new 
relations between elements of practice that enable creative freedom through constraint. 
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